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Abstract 
Ruminative thinking is believed to exacerbate the psychological distress that follows 
stressful life events. An experience-sampling study was conducted in which 
participants recorded negative life events, ruminative self-focus, and negative affect 
eight times daily over one week. Occasions when participants reported a negative 
event were marked by higher levels of negative affect. Additionally, negative events 
were prospectively associated with higher levels of negative affect at the next 
sampling occasion, and this relationship was partially mediated by momentary 
ruminative self-focus. Depressive symptoms were associated with more frequent 
negative events, but not with increased reactivity to negative events. Trait rumination 
was associated with reports of more severe negative events and increased reactivity to 
negative events. These results suggest that the extent to which a person engages in 
ruminative self-focus after everyday stressors is an important determinant of the 
degree of distress experienced after such events. Further, dispositional measures of 
rumination predict mood reactivity to everyday stressors in a non-clinical sample. 
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1. Introduction 
Dysfunctional mood regulation has been highlighted as a key factor in the onset 
and maintenance of psychological distress. Particular interest has centred on 
rumination, defined by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991, p. 569) as “repetitively focusing on 
the fact that one is depressed; on one’s symptoms of depression; and on the causes, 
meanings, and consequences of depressive symptoms”. According to response styles 
theory (RST), a ruminative response style prolongs sad mood relative to engagement 
in pleasant, distracting activities (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). Considerable 
evidence suggests that dysphoric rumination exacerbates negative mood and negative 
cognition (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004; Watkins, 2008). 
A related line of investigation addresses how rumination influences emotional 
reactions to stressful life events. Controlling initial levels of depression, a ruminative 
response style predicts future depressive symptoms in response to events such as the 
Lomo Prieta earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) or the death of a loved 
one (Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). Similarly, Robinson and Alloy 
(2003) reported that rumination on negative inferences after stressful events (stress-
reactive rumination) interacted with dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributional 
style to predict new depressive episodes among students.  
Despite a large body of research suggesting that stressful life events are 
associated with short-term increases in negative affect (Marco & Suls, 1993; Suls, 
Green, & Hillis, 1998; Swendsen, 1998), little is known about the role of rumination 
in this process. The first objective of the present study was to address how negative 
affect fluctuates after everyday stressors, and whether levels of momentary ruminative 
self-focus mediate this relationship. The second objective was to investigate whether 
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individuals who report high levels of trait rumination (high ruminators) show greater 
reactivity to negative life events than low ruminators. 
Many studies examining the influence of rumination on reactivity to stressful 
events have used retrospective assessments that may not accurately reflect how 
individuals responded shortly after the stressful event (Stone et al., 1998). Daily diary 
designs represent an improvement in this regard (e.g., Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, 
& Rachmiel, 1990), but often require that reports of response styles are made several 
hours after their occurrence, increasing the probability of retrospective bias.  
In experience-sampling methodology (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987) studies, the participant provides ‘online’ data about experience as prompted by 
an alarm signal. Retrospective bias is thus virtually eliminated, although ESM 
remains susceptible to other response biases that are inherent in self-report measures 
(Stone et al., 1998). Furthermore, ESM can track fluctuations in affect and ruminative 
self-focus over relatively short temporal intervals, enabling the researcher to examine 
contingencies of which the participant may be unaware.   
Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, & deVries (2003) used ESM to 
investigate the effect of positive and negative life events on mood among depressed 
individuals and non-depressed controls. Although negative events were associated 
with increased negative affect in both groups, depressed participants were less 
reactive to negative events than non-depressed participants. Swendsen (1998) 
similarly found that negative events were associated with negative affect among 
undergraduates, but this relationship was not moderated by depressive 
symptomatology. 
Given that rumination is normally conceptualized as a response to negative 
mood, one might expect rumination to moderate and/or mediate the impact of 
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distressing events on psychological distress. In an ESM study of adolescents, Silk, 
Steinberg, & Morris (2003) found that the use of involuntary engagement strategies 
(including rumination) after negative events was associated with greater sadness and 
anger at a subsequent occasion, and that higher levels of involuntary engagement over 
the week were associated with more depressive symptoms. Unfortunately, this study 
did not uniquely address ruminative thinking. 
We conducted an ESM study in which adults reported their negative affect, 
ruminative self-focus, and negative events eight times daily for one week. On each 
occasion, we measured momentary negative affect as a composite of sadness, anxiety, 
and irritation ratings, on the basis that rumination is associated with each of these 
affects (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). Participants indicated on each occasion whether or not they had 
experienced a recent negative event, provided a brief description of this event, and 
indicated how emotionally distressing it was. 
We assessed momentary ruminative self-focus using a two-item measure 
comprising the extent to which people were focused on (i) their feelings and (ii) their 
problems. The first item corresponds to the facet of Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) 
definition involving focus on depressive feelings. The second item corresponds to the 
facet of Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition implicating focus on causes and 
consequences of depression. Focus on problems matches discrepancy-based accounts 
suggesting that unresolved problems underlie rumination (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, 
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Martin & Tesser, 1996). 
We hypothesised that negative affect would be associated with (i) negative 
events that were reported concurrently and (ii) prior negative events that were 
reported at the previous occasion. Second, we hypothesized that negative affect would 
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be predicted by momentary ruminative self-focus at the previous occasion. Third, 
because emotionally negative events tend to induce ruminative self-focus (Wood, 
Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990), we hypothesized that ruminative self-focus would 
partially mediate the association between prior negative events and negative affect. 
Fourth, informed by RST, we hypothesised that trait rumination would moderate the 
association between negative events and negative affect such that high trait 
ruminators would report more negative affect after negative events than low trait 
ruminators. However, on the basis of previous findings, we did not expect levels of 
depressive symptomatology to moderate the association between negative events and 
negative affect. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter and the local area 
using e-mails and newspaper advertisements. We requested volunteers for a study on 
sad moods and depression, although we made it clear that participants did not have to 
be depressed to take part. Thus, we obtained a sample with a wide range of depressive 
symptomatology as assessed on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (range 0-37, M = 
15.4, SD = 9.2). One hundred thirty-nine persons (100 women) initially consented to 
take part (range = 18-67 years, M = 26.8, SD = 13.3). Most (107) were university 
students, the remainder were community adults. Data from a subset of these 
participants examining the direct relationship between negative affect and ruminative 
self-focus were previously reported by Moberly and Watkins (2008). Participants 
were paid £10 ($20) for completing the study.  
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  
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The BDI-II assesses levels of depressive symptomatology with 21 items that 
are rated on a scale from 0 to 3, with higher scores reflecting more depressive 
symptoms (range 0-63). Cronbach’s alpha for our sample was .90. 
2.2.2. Response Styles Questionnaire–Ruminative Responses Scale (RSQ; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  
The RSQ assesses the extent to which individuals respond to depressed mood 
by focusing on self, symptoms and on the causes and consequences of their mood 
(trait rumination), using 22 items rated on a 4-point frequency scale. Cronbach’s alpha 
for our sample was .91.  
2.3. Procedure  
 We used ESM to assess negative affect, ruminative self-focus and negative 
events eight times daily over seven days. Participants rated their moods and thinking 
styles when signalled by an alarm from a wrist-worn actiwatch (Cambridge 
Neurotechnology Ltd., Cambridge, UK). Each participant’s day was divided into eight 
equal periods so that one alarm occurred at a random time within each period, and no 
two alarms occurred within 15 min. We sampled eight times daily to capture a range 
of psychological states without over-burdening the participant, as typical of similar 
experience-sampling studies (Marco & Suls, 1993). This resulted in a 12 hr daily 
sampling period with one alarm occurring within each of eight 90 min periods (e.g., 
10.00 to 22.00). Times were individually randomised for each participant to suit their 
typical waking hours (actual range: 07.00-23.59). 
At each alarm, a flashing letter on an LED display prompted participants to 
enter a rating for the moment before the alarm sounded, by pressing a button on the 
actiwatch to cycle through ratings from 1 to 7. After each rating was entered, the next 
letter was displayed and the participant made the next rating. The actiwatch only 
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accepted entries within 20 s of each alarm, ensuring all data were entered promptly. 
Participants recorded their levels of sadness (S), anxiety (N), and irritation (I), and the 
extent to which they were focusing on their feelings (F) and focusing on their 
problems (P) on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). As an aide 
memoire, participants carried a card on their person that explained these prompts. 
Participants received separate booklets for each day of the study. Each booklet 
included eight experience-sampling forms, each of which corresponded to an 
actiwatch alarm. Spaces were provided for participants to record (a) time and date of 
form completion, and (b) elapsed time since the alarm. Printed below was the 
question: ‘Since the last beep, have you experienced an event that made you feel 
negative emotions?’, which participants answered by circling either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ and 
writing down a brief description of the event if it occurred. Scales were provided on 
which participants could rate the extent to which they felt sad, anxious, and irritable 
when the negative event occurred from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). To examine 
persisting effects of negative events, we identified negative events as prior when the 
previous ESM report on the same day (time t-1) mentioned a negative event. 
At an initial briefing session, participants completed baseline measures of trait 
rumination and depressive symptoms. Next, participants were shown the actiwatch 
and experience-sampling forms, and participants practised responding to a 
hypothetical alarm. We emphasised that the actiwatch questions referred to the 
moment just before the alarm sounded. The participant then chose the beginning and 
end of the sampling period, and this information was used to configure the actiwatch. 
After the sampling week, participants returned the actiwatch and forms to the 
laboratory, before being paid and debriefed. 
2.4. Treatment of experience-sampling data 
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Data were excluded from twenty-two participants who withdrew from the 
study during the week of experience sampling (n = 13, ESM was too time-consuming; 
n = 5, actiwatch malfunctioned; n = 1, illness; n = 1, family emergency; n = 1, 
experienced mood recording as upsetting; n = 1, ESM interfered with therapy). Data 
were also excluded for occasions when the participant failed to complete the watch 
and form ratings within 15 minutes. Timely completion of the experience-sampling 
forms was verified with reference to (i) the reported time of form completion and (ii) 
the reported time interval between the actiwatch signal and form completion. 
Following standard guidelines (Delespaul, 1995), 11 participants who responded to 
less than one-third of the alarms within 15 min were excluded from the analysis. 
These non-completers did not differ significantly from completers on BDI-II score, 
RSQ score, gender or age. 
Data from 106 participants (78 women) were analysed (age range = 18-77 
years, M = 26.8 years, SD = 13.3)
1
. The mean response rate to the actiwatch alarms 
was 82.6% (SD = 10.9%) and the mean completion rate for the experience-sampling 
forms was 63.4% (SD = 15.4%). The total number of occasions that were validly 
recorded and analysed was 3,775. 
We calculated a composite measure of momentary negative affect by 
standardizing each of the sad, anxious, and irritated ratings and summing the resulting 
z-scores (α = .70). We calculated a composite measure of momentary ruminative self-
focus by standardizing the focus on feelings and focus on problems ratings and 
summing the resulting z-scores (α = .67).  
2.5 Multilevel modelling 
 In our data structure, occasions (Level 1) were nested within days (Level 2) 
and within persons (Level 3). We used hierarchical linear modelling to investigate the 
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relationships within and between different levels without violating assumptions of 
independence (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), using MLwiN v.2.02 software to conduct 
our analyses (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 2005). 
Our main analysis examined the concurrent and prospective association 
between negative events (recorded at time t and prior time t-1) and negative affect 
(recorded at time t). To do this, we constructed a multilevel model using a subset of 
the dataset (2,459 occasions) for which two subsequent occasions were recorded. We 
did not include a lagged measure of negative affect (recorded at time t-1) because it 
was highly likely to be correlated with the random parts of the multilevel model, 
thereby violating a key modelling assumption (Spencer, 2002). 
In our model, the intercept was specified as randomly varying at both the day 
and person levels, reflecting the fact that observations tend to be more similar if they 
are (a) taken on the same day, and (b) taken from the same person. All occasion-level 
predictors were modeled with coefficients that were randomly varying at the person 
level, to allow the relationship between negative events, ruminative self-focus, and 
negative affect to vary between individuals. 
 Trait dispositional variables and momentary ratings of ruminative self-focus 
were entered as continuous explanatory variables centred on the grand mean. Linear 
and quadratic variables for time of day (measured in days and centred on the mean 
sampling time, 15:04) and linear variables for day of study (centred on day 4) were 
also included as covariates. 
3. Results 
3.1. Negative events 
 Participants recorded 652 negative events. Using pre-established criteria 
(Peeters et al., 2003), the first author categorised each event as external if it had been 
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prompted by a past event or situation that occurred outside the person, or internal if it 
had not. Internal events included unprompted thoughts, ruminations, and worries. A 
final-year psychology undergraduate independently categorised all negative events, 
yielding 93% category agreement with the first coder, κ = .77. Remaining differences 
were resolved through discussion. This process identified 128 internal events (19.6%). 
Results were similar whether or not internal events were excluded, and so results 
including all events are reported. 
Negative event frequency was significantly correlated with BDI-II score, 
r(106) = .24, p = .01, but not with RSQ score, r(106) = .12, p = .24. Mean negative 
event severity (calculated by standardizing and summing the event-specific ratings of 
sadness, anxiety and irritation) correlated positively with BDI-II score, r(93) = .32, p 
< .01, and RSQ score, r(93) = .42, p < .001. RSQ score was associated with negative 
event severity when controlling BDI-II score, r(90) = .29, p < .01, but BDI-II score 
was not associated with negative event severity when controlling RSQ score, r(90) = 
.08, ns.
2
 Negative event frequency and mean negative event severity were not 
significantly correlated, r(93) = –.06, ns. 
3.2. Negative events and concurrent negative affect  
We first modelled negative affect with linear and quadratic effects of time and 
linear effects of day to control for temporal variation in negative affect and reduce the 
autocorrelation between successive observations. There was a significant linear effect 
of time on negative affect, B = –0.787, SE = 0.368, p < .05, such that negative affect 
tended to decrease over the course of the day. No other fixed effects were significant. 
Inclusion of the time and day variables resulted in a significant improvement in model 
fit over the null model, change in log-likelihood χ2(8) = 51.41, p < .001. 
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 Subsequently, to account for individual differences in mean levels of negative 
affect, we simultaneously added the person-level variables of depressive 
symptomatology and trait rumination. Both depressive symptoms (B = 0.485, SE = 
0.128, p < .001) and trait rumination (B = 0.039, SE = 0.013, p < .01) were associated 
with mean levels of negative affect. The addition of these variables resulted in a 
significant improvement in model fit, χ2(2) = 48.55, p < .001.3 
To test our first hypothesis that negative events would be positively associated 
with negative affect at the contemporaneous sampling occasion (time t), we entered a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not participants reported a negative event 
at time t. In the same step, we entered negative event frequency and its interaction 
with negative events, to test whether negative affect was associated with negative 
event frequency and whether individuals who reported more frequent negative events 
would be more or less reactive to such events.  As hypothesized, negative events 
reported at time t were associated with higher levels of concurrent negative affect at 
time t, B = 2.202, SE = 0.469, p < .001. Frequency of negative event reports was 
unrelated to mean levels of negative affect, B = 0.952, SE = 0.674, ns. Negative 
events interacted significantly with negative event frequency to predict negative 
affect, B = –1.956, SE = 0.977, p < .05, indicating that individuals reporting more 
frequent negative events were less reactive to these events than individuals reporting 
less frequent negative events. Inclusion of these terms resulted in a significantly 
improved model fit, χ2(21) = 236.53, p < .001. 
3.3. Negative events and prospective negative affect  
 In the next step, we tested our hypotheses that negative events and ruminative 
self-focus at the previous sampling occasion (time t-1) would each predict negative 
affect at the subsequent occasion (time t). We entered a dichotomous variable 
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indicating whether or not a prior negative event had been reported at time t-1 and a 
continuous variable representing prior momentary ruminative self-focus at time t-1. 
The report of a prior negative event at time t-1 was associated with higher levels of 
negative affect at time t, B = 0.447, SE = 0.111, p < .001. Higher levels of prior 
ruminative self-focus at time t-1 were also associated with higher levels of negative 
affect at time t, B = 0.152, SE = 0.029, p < .001. The inclusion of prior negative 
events and prior ruminative self-focus significantly improved the model fit, χ2(13) = 
100.83, p < .001. 
 We next tested the hypothesis that prior momentary ruminative self-focus 
mediated the prospective effect of prior negative events on negative affect (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). First, we tested the path from the initial variable to the putative 
mediator, by constructing a model with prior ruminative self-focus as the criterion 
variable. This revealed that prior negative events predicted prior ruminative self-
focus, B = 0.836, SE = 0.102, p < .001. Second, we tested the direct path from the 
initial variable to the criterion variable in the absence of the mediator. Prior negative 
events predicted negative affect when ruminative self-focus was not included in the 
model, B = 0.580, SE = 0.110, p < .001. Third, as shown earlier, the mediator 
predicted the outcome variable: prior ruminative self-focus was significantly 
associated with negative affect. Fourth, the relationship between the initial variable 
and the outcome variable was reduced when the mediator was included: the 
magnitude of the prior negative event coefficient reduced from 0.836 to 0.447 when 
prior ruminative self-focus was included (see previous analysis). Conditions for 
partial mediation were met (Sobel test, z = 4.44, p < .001). 
For multilevel models with lower-level path coefficients that vary randomly at 
a higher level, Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger (2003) warn that calculation of the 
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indirect path must consider the covariance between the higher-level random effects. 
Using their procedure, in which OLS estimates for the indirect paths are calculated for 
each person, we estimated the covariance between the person-level random effects to 
be 0.03. Because this covariance and the path coefficients for the indirect path were 
positive, our prior calculation of the indirect effect was an underestimate: 26% (rather 
than 22%, according to the standard approach) of the total effect of prior negative 
events on negative affect was mediated by prior ruminative self-focus.
4
 
In a final step, we tested the hypothesis that trait rumination would moderate 
the impact of negative events on negative affect, but depressive symptomatology 
would not. To do this, we simultaneously included cross-level interactions between 
each of the person-level variables (BDI-II and RSQ) and (i) negative events (time t) 
and (ii) prior negative events (time t-1). Coefficients for this final model are shown in 
Table 1. The interaction between trait rumination and negative events (time t) was 
associated with negative affect, but no other interaction was significant. Consistent 
with RST, high ruminators experienced greater negative affect after negative events 
than low ruminators (at time t; see Figure 1). The interactions between depressive 
symptomatology and negative events were not significantly associated with negative 
affect. Inclusion of all interactions resulted in a significant improvement in model fit, 
χ2(4) = 14.01, p < .01.5  
When internal negative events were excluded, the interaction between 
depressive sympatomatology and prior negative events became statistically 
significant, B = –0.228, SD = 0.115, p < .05, such that persons reporting more 
depressive symptomatology were less reactive to prior negative events. All other 
significant findings remained unchanged. 
4. Discussion 
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 Our finding of an association between negative events and negative affect 
replicates the results of other diary and experience-sampling studies (Marco & Suls, 
1993; Peeters et al., 2003; Swendsen, 1998). Although we found that prior negative 
events predicted negative mood up to three hours later, evidence from other ESM 
studies has been inconsistent. Marco and Suls (1993) failed to find any effect on 
mood of prior negative events occurring on average 90 minutes previously, while 
Peeters et al. (2003) found that prior negative events were associated with negative 
affect for individuals in a major depressive episode but not for non-depressed 
individuals. By contrast, van Eck, Nicolson, & Berkhof (1998) found that prior 
stressful events were associated with increased negative affect in community adults. 
Differences in the operationalization of negative events may account for these 
divergent findings. 
 Our study demonstrates that momentary ruminative self-focus partially 
mediates the relationship between prior negative events and momentary negative 
affect. The absence of evidence for an interaction between prior negative events and 
ruminative self-focus testifies to the adverse consequences of ruminative thought in 
many circumstances, and not only after stressful events (see Moberly & Watkins, 
2008). Our mediation analysis suggests that one reason why negative events are 
distressing in the short-term is because they induce ruminative thinking, which itself 
has depressogenic consequences (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). To our 
knowledge, this study is the first to have used online measures with sufficient 
temporal resolution to identify this role of ruminative self-focus in emotional 
reactivity after negative events. 
 We found that trait ruminators experienced greater negative affect after 
negative events that were reported at the same occasion. This result is congruent with 
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Robinson and Alloy’s (2003) finding that the combination of elevated trait rumination 
and a stressful event is associated with increased distress. Trait rumination did not 
interact with prior negative events to predict subsequent negative affect, possibly 
because prior momentary ruminative self-focus was already included in the model. 
Interestingly, trait ruminators reported their negative events as more severe than other 
individuals did, even after controlling for depressive symptomatology. Though a 
ruminative tendency may make negative events seem worse, interpretation of this 
finding is complicated by the possibility that event severity judgments were 
influenced by the elevated levels of negative affect that high ruminators recorded 
when the negative event was reported. 
Replicating Swendsen’s (1998) results, we found no evidence that dysphoric 
individuals were especially reactive to negative events. In fact, when internal events 
were excluded, more dysphoric persons were less reactive to prior negative events 
than others. Peeters et al. (2003) found that clinically depressed participants were less 
reactive than non-depressed controls immediately after negative events, but were 
more reactive to negative events that occurred at the previous sampling occasion. 
Relatedly, laboratory studies have found that depressed individuals show reduced 
emotional reactivity to personally-relevant negative material (Rottenberg, 2005).  
Although negative event frequency was not uniquely associated with negative 
affect, participants with more depressive symptoms reported more frequent negative 
events, replicating diary studies with non-clinical samples (e.g., Grosscup & 
Lewinsohn, 1980). Interestingly, individuals reporting a high frequency of negative 
events were also less reactive to these events. This is unlikely to be due to more 
liberal event-reporting criteria, because frequency and mean event severity were not 
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significantly correlated. Though requiring replication, this finding suggests that 
emotional response may become desensitized after repeated negative life events. 
This study has several limitations. First, the sample consisted mainly of 
undergraduates, who may differ from other adults in the events they experience and 
their reaction to these events. Second, the demanding ESM protocol means that our 
volunteers may have been more conscientious and self-focused than the wider 
population (Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). Advertising the study as relevant 
to depression is likely to have resulted in volunteers with more depressive symptoms 
than randomly selected individuals. However, because it is debatable whether clinical 
depression differs dimensionally or categorically from non-clinical depression (Flett, 
Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997), it is unclear whether our findings would generalize to 
a clinically depressed sample. 
Other concerns relate to the adequacy of our experience-sampling procedure. 
To minimise participant burden, we used only three items to measure negative affect 
and two items to measure ruminative self-focus. Although the composites 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, future research would ideally use a 
more comprehensive set of items to capture these constructs. Excluding occasions 
when participants failed to respond within 15 minutes may have resulted in an under-
representation of certain everyday situations (e.g., driving). Relatedly, we could not 
verify participants’ reports of when the experience-sampling form was completed. 
‘Backfilling’ is relatively common in diary and experience-sampling studies (Stone, 
Shiffman, Schwarz, Broderick, & Hufford, 2002). Future studies could use electronic 
personal data assistants to record the time of data entry more precisely.  
Because participants recorded negative events after rating their negative affect, 
concurrent associations between these variables cannot establish that negative events 
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caused negative affect. Nevertheless, our finding that prior negative events predicted 
subsequent negative affect does suggest that negative events have a prospective 
influence on negative affect. Finally, our multilevel analysis prevented us from 
controlling for prior levels of negative affect. Although we designed our composite 
measure of ruminative self-focus to be independent of negative affect, it is possible 
that the influence of prior ruminative self-focus was overestimated.  
Our study provides further support for Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) RST in 
relation to everyday stressful events. Momentary ruminative self-focus partially 
mediated the association between prior negative events and negative affect, while trait 
rumination moderated the association between negative life events and negative 
affect. By developing our understanding of mood regulation in an ecologically valid 
setting, we hope these results will contribute to the development of therapeutic 
approaches that improve psychological resilience. 
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Footnotes 
1
The small number of males resulted in low statistical power to detect gender 
effects and so we did not include this variable in our analyses. 
2
Neither the RSQ brooding (α = .72) nor the reflective pondering (α = .74) 
subscale scores (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) were significantly 
associated with negative event frequency. Brooding was associated with negative 
event severity, r(93) = .36, p < .001, but reflection was not, r(93) = .12, ns. Brooding 
was significantly associated with negative event severity after controlling for BDI-II 
score, r(90) = .24, p < .02. 
3
When the RSQ brooding and reflective pondering subscales were substituted 
for the total score, brooding was associated with higher mean levels of negative 
affect, B = 0.147, SE = 0.048, p < .01, as was depressive symptomatology, B = 0.538, 
SE = 0.117, p < .001. Reflective pondering was not significantly associated with mean 
levels of negative affect, B = –0.019, SE = 0.040, ns. 
4
Although the dynamic, inter-correlated nature of our variables suggest that a 
mediating (rather than moderator) role for ruminative self-focus is most appropriate, 
we also tested the interaction between prior negative events and prior ruminative self-
focus in a subsequent step, but the coefficient was not significant, B = –0.038, SE = 
0.049, ns, and its inclusion did not significantly improve model fit, χ2(1) = 0.55, ns. 
5
When RSQ brooding and reflective pondering subscale scores were entered 
instead of the RSQ total score, brooding interacted significantly with both negative 
events, B = 0.186, SE = 0.051, p < .001, and prior negative events, B = 0.082, SE = 
0.042, p < .05, indicating that negative events were more strongly predictive of 
negative affect for brooders. The only other significant cross-level interaction was that 
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prior negative events were less strongly associated with negative affect for individuals 
who reported greater depressive symptomatology, B = –0.240, SD = 0.108, p < .05. 
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Table 1 
Fixed Effects Estimates for Negative Affect 
 
 
Predictor 
 
 
Coefficient (SE) 
 
Person-level variables  
     BDI-II 0.431 (0.124)** 
     RSQ 0.031 (0.012)* 
     NEP 0.473 (0.640) 
Momentary variables  
     NE 2.111 (0.422)*** 
     PNE 0.472 (0.111)*** 
     PRSF 0.151 (0.028)*** 
Cross-level interactions  
     NEP x NE –1.802 (0.875)* 
     BDI-II x NE –0.145 (0.139) 
     RSQ x NE    0.043 (0.013)** 
     BDI-II x PNE –0.202 (0.114) 
     RSQ x PNE 0.010 (0.010) 
 
Note. Analyses include 2,459 occasions. Model includes linear and quadratic effects of time 
of day, and linear effect of day. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient differs significantly 
from 0. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II, RSQ = Ruminative Response Scale (total 
score), NEP = proportion of occasions on which a negative event was reported, NE = negative 
event (reported at time t), PNE = prior negative event (reported at time t-1), PRSF = prior 
ruminative self-focus (reported at time t-1).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 27 
Figure 1. Relationship between reported occurrence of a negative event and negative 
affect (both reported at time t) for individuals scoring high (one SD above the mean) 
and low (one SD below the mean) on trait rumination (RSQ). Negative affect is a 
summed composite of the standardized ratings for individual items. 
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